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MORALITY, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE
FAMILY: THE ROLE OF MARRIAGE AND
THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE
June Carbone*
I. AN OVERVIEW
In thinking about our images of the family, I find that
the source of at least some of our apparent disagreement
about family values, ethics, and public policy stems from the
location of these issues in the classically liberal divide be-
tween public and private.' At the same time that the demar-
cation between public and private has been used to mark the
limits of state power, American family policy has depended
on consensus in the realm clearly designated as private. To
the extent that the United States can ever be said to have
had a national family policy, it is one that insists on marriage
as the sole legitimate locus for childrearing. Yet, as Martha
Fineman observes, marriage, as the defining element of the
family and the primary means of providing for children, has
not so much been legislated as assumed. 2 It has been as-
sumed as a central and permanent feature of society synony-
mous with civilization itself.3 The moral justification for
marriage as the sole appropriate forum for the expression of
sexuality and the children who result has also been assumed
as much as legislated largely on the basis of deeply held be-
liefs, often religious in origin, that are rarely examined di-
rectly in public debate. At least in the modern era, the mech-
anisms that have made marriage nearly universal have been
a set of less visible, and essentially private mechanisms that,
* Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University. I am deeply in-
debted to Leslie Griffin and Jonathan Bush for their comments on earlier drafts
of this manuscript, and to Christie Vail for her assistance with the research.
1. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, Mill and the Value of Moral Distress, in
LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS, 1981-1993, 115, 115-33 (1993) (discussing
John Stuart Mill).
2. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER,
THE SExUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).
3. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 30, 32.
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until recently, made childrearing outside of marriage untena-
ble while tying the promise of economic security to those who
remained within.
Almost all of the discussion in this symposium, and much
of the contemporary debate about the family, can be charac-
terized as a discussion of the appropriate societal responses
to the breakdown of the universality of marriage. The statis-
tics are becoming familiar ones. Whereas in 1960, nine of ten
children were being raised in two-parent families, today no
more than three out of four are, and the percentage is contin-
uing to drop.4 Half of all marriages, and sixty percent of sec-
ond marriages end in divorce.5 Thirty percent of all births
now occur outside of marriage, and single parenthood has
been correlated (with heated debates about causation) to
every conceivable childhood ill from murder to obesity.6 It is
tempting, in listening to this debate, to group the opposite
sides in terms of their positions on marriage. Such a charac-
terization would term the "family values" position as one that
favors putting the genie back in the bottle, or at least the
church hall, and using the power of the state to reinforce the
traditional morality that obliged parents to marry and stay
married.7 The other pole of the debate would characterize
the developments away from universal insistence on mar-
riage as a needed and inevitable response to changes in the
organization of the economy and the greater independence of
women.
8
In considering the papers presented at this symposium,
however, I would like to suggest that we resist the temptation
to group responses solely in these terms. For complicating
the discussion are not just differences about the role of mar-
riage, but differences about the appropriate role of the state.
Many of those who find the percentage of children being
raised in single-parent families destructive would oppose
4. Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Respon-
sibility and the Public Interest, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 166,
177 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma H. Kay eds., 1990) (quoting a 1986 essay
by Sen. Daniel Moynihan).
5. SUSAN M. O.IN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 160 (1989).
6. VICTOR FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 104-10 (1988).
7. See, e.g., Charles Murray, No Point Fiddling with Welfare at the Mar-
gin, LONDON TIMES, July 11, 1993, at 1-13; Barbara D. Whitehead, Dan Quayle
Was Right, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1993, at 47.
8. See generally FINEMAN, supra note 2.
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state efforts to restrict the availability of divorce or to stigma-
tize nonmarital births. Others who would like to provide
greater recognition and support for nontraditional families
are nonetheless critical of the role state policies have played
in undermining traditional families.9 Many of the differences
between Martha Fineman, who would leave more of the de-
termination of family structure and less of the need for finan-
cial provision to the private sphere, and William Galston,
who would use state policy to encourage traditional family
structure by placing a larger portion of the financial responsi-
bility for children directly on parents, are differences about
the appropriate role of the state as much as they are differ-
ences about family values.
In introducing this symposium, I would like to focus on
the relationship between our private value systems toward
marriage, sex, and children and the appropriate direction of
state policy. Should public policy seek to regulate sexuality,
promote traditional two-parent families, protect the well-be-
ing of children independent of family structure, and advance
gender equality and/or individual liberty? Or should public
policy instead seek to remain neutral in the face of wide-
spread and deeply held differences about all of these issues?
Should state policy proceed from a broad-based religious,
philosophical or moral commitment to particular forms of
family organization, or should it reflect utilitarian concerns
for the well-being of children and their importance to society?
Inspired by the Passover season in which this conference oc-
curred, I would like to attempt to clarify some of the relation-
ships between public and private by asking four questions
that I find central to thinking about the family and public
policy.
The first question is whether the United States has, or,
indeed, has ever had a family policy as such. The reflexive
answer is "no." Compared to Western Europe, the UnitedStates has never adopted a comprehensive system of provi-
9. For a discussion of the different responses to divorce and an evaluation
of the possible alternatives, see Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., History and Current
Status of Divorce in the United States, 4 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 29 (1994)
(concluding that neither moral suasion nor public policy efforts were likely to
have much impact on rates of family dissolution).
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sion for children.' ° Recast in terms of the divide between
public and private, however, this "no" becomes no more than
a statement that the United States has never acknowledged a
public responsibility to provide directly for families or for
children. For when the public and private spheres are con-
sidered together, a fairly clear family policy does emerge, at
least in hindsight. U.S. law, policy, and social mores have
long focused on an overwhelming, some would argue exclu-
sive, emphasis on traditional marriage as the only legitimate
locus of childrearing. 1" Within this system, the state has reg-
ulated marriage, divorce, the status of children, and the fi-
nancial consequences of these relationships, but state respon-
sibility for children's well-being has been largely discharged
with the creation and maintenance of the marital union.' 2
Exact identification of marriage as a matter of national
family policy, even as a starting point for discussion, is none-
theless problematic. Historically, such a policy emerges from
a hodgepodge of federal, state, and private sources. Nonethe-
less, the public policy elements that arguably comprise family
policy consist of some combination of the following:
(1) a set of moral codes criminalizing fornication, adul-
tery, and sodomy;' 3
(2) regulation of marriage, and reliance on the parents'
marital bond to define family relationships, including, for ex-
ample, a father's differing ties to marital and nonmarital
children;' 4
(3) regulation of the grounds for, and financial conse-
quences of divorce;'-
(4) regulation and sometimes prohibition of birth con-
trol, abortion, and adoption;'"
10. See generally MARY A. GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW
137 (1989).
11. See FIrNEMAN, supra note 2, at 145-76.
12. On the use of the public/private distinction to block state intervention
into ongoing marriages, see Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A
Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1497, 1501-13 (1983)
[hereinafter Olsen, The Family and the Market]. See also Frances E. Olsen, The
Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 835 (1985)
[hereinafter Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention].
13. See FINEMAN, supra note 2, at 146-47. Fineman observes, however, that
in recent years many states have repealed such legislation. Id.
14. Id. at 148.
15. See generally Sanford N. Katz, Historical Perspective and Current
Trends in the Legal Process of Divorce, 4 THE FuTuRE OF CHILDREN 44 (1994).
16. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 2, at 181-86.
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(5) policies such as minimum wage and maximum hour
provisions, restrictions on the role of women in the work-
place, and labor laws justified, at least in part, on the impor-
tance of securing the availability of a family wage;17
(6) social security provisions designed to insure against
loss of the primary wage-earner; 18
(7) AFDC assistance premised on the role of the govern-
ment in providing a safety net for dependent children; 19
(8) tax and other policies written to subsidize traditional
families; 20
(9) the separate spheres ideology that combines state
regulation of family creation and dissolution with barriers to
intervention in the affairs of ongoing families.2 '
Taken together, these provisions embrace a recognition
of marriage as the only sanctioned form of sexual expression;
state support, both symbolic and financial, for marriage as a
gendered division of labor designed to accommodate chil-
drearing; and state subsidization of marriage as a source of
financial security sufficient to raise a family. Recent changes,
however, have called all of these elements into question.
First, although some of the laws regulating sexuality re-
main on the books, many have been repealed or remain unen-
forced. The line of privacy cases that starts with Griswold v.
Connecticut,22 together with the controversy surrounding the
Supreme Court's five to four decision in Bowers v. Hard-
wick,23 suggests considerable support for treating matters of
sexual expression, if not necessarily childrearing itself, as
17. See Joan C. Williams, Women and Property, in A PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY
182, 183 (Richard H. Chused ed., 1993).
18. Steven D. Sugarman, Reforming Welfare Through Social Security, 23 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 817 (1993).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Anne L. Alsott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limita-
tions of Tax-Based Welfare Reforms, 108 HAv. L. REV. 533, 559-64, 576-79
(1995); Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating
Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1980); Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation
and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Bias in the Code, 40 UCLA
L. REV. 983 (1993); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL.
L. REV. 339 (1994).
21. See, e.g., Olsen, The Family and the Market, supra note 12; Olsen, Myth
of State Intervention, supra note 12.
22. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
23. 478 U.S. 479 (1986).
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within a private realm that should be free from state
intervention.24
Second, state regulation of family creation and dissolu-
tion has moved away from insistence on marriage as the ex-
clusive source of family ties. The universal adoption of no-
fault grounds for divorce has effectively eliminated the legal
recognition of marriage as a lifelong commitment, and the
dismantling of the distinction between marital and
nonmarital children has abolished much of the role of mar-
riage as a defining element in parental (and particularly pa-
ternal) relationships.2 5
Third, the wholesale movement of married women into
the labor market has rendered untenable the breadwinner/
homemaker family upon which much of family tax and other
financial policies are based. Finally, labor market changes
have rendered illusory the promise of financial security once
associated with stable marriages.26
While it is difficult to identify an American family policy
independent of reliance on marriage, the result of these
changes is to call into question the coherence and viability of
a policy that continues to rely exclusively on marriage to se-
cure children's well-being.
The second question concerns the source of authority for
state regulation of marriage and the family. There are two
main justifications. The first equates an insistence on mar-
riage with regulation of sexual morality. The second pro-
ceeds on utilitarian grounds to link marriage to a form of eco-
nomic organization designed to provide for children, and,
Fineman argues, other dependent members of society.27 Be-
cause state insistence on marriage, as opposed to the terms of
its creation and dissolution, has so rarely been examined, the
different justifications are intertwined, and both lie on the
fault lines between consideration of family issues as matters
of "public" or "private" concern.
24. See generally FINEMAN, supra note 2, at 147 n.9.
25. Id. at 147; see also Katz, supra note 15, at 45-49.
26. See generally FUCHS, supra note 6; see also PAULA ENGLAND & GEORGE
FARKAS, HOUSEHOLDS, EMPLOYMENT, AND GENDER 54-63 (1986); CLAUDIA GoL-
DIN, UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER GAP: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN
WOMEN (1990).
27. FINEMAN, supra note 2, at 161-64.
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The first issue involves the degree to which the centrality
of marriage to regulation of the family proceeds from, or nec-
essarily involves, regulation of sexual morality. The histori-
cal answer is unequivocal. Review of the origins of American
family law reveals an almost seamless integration of social,
legal, and religious strictures regulating sexuality and the
family.2" Grossberg describes colonial family legislation and
custom, which prescribed the death penalty for "adulterie"
and "sodomie," as a "blend of Calvinism, Anglicanism, and
English ecclesiastical law."29 Even with the adoption of the
First Amendment, the Supreme Court, faced with a challenge
late in the nineteenth century to the ban on polygamy in the
Utah territories, had no trouble declaring that "[t]he organi-
zation of a community for the spread and practice of polyg-
amy is, in a measure, a return to barbarism. It is contrary to
the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which Christi-
anity has produced in the Western world."30 Early American
family law was marked by a clear identification of sexual mo-
rality as fundamental to the importance of marriage, and was
religious, if not necessarily sectarian, in origin.
With time, American law has nonetheless moved away
from religious justifications of marriage without abandoning
28. Fineman describes this as the "[mierger of [slacred and [slecular."
FINEMAN, supra note 2, at 150. This merger reached its height in the small New
England communities with religious origins. In these communities, there was
no clear separation of Church and State, or of secular law enforcement from
religious orthodoxy. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW
AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 19 (1985); THE LAWS AND
LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 5 (Max Farrand ed., 1929).
Looking at the relationship between religious and secular over a longer pe-
riod, however, discloses a much more complex relationship. Both the rise of
Islam in the Middle East and of Christianity in Europe involved efforts to con-
trol what was often perceived as destructive licentiousness. The priests and
mullahs then institutionalized religious victories in organizations that regu-
lated, among other things, family structure. Lawrence Stone describes a
lengthy period of struggle in England in which the Catholic Church sought to
insure that the validity of marriage, and the corresponding inheritance rights,
depended on compliance with Church precepts. Given the importance of inher-
ited wealth, control of family creation and dissolution was a source of considera-
ble power. Henry VIII's break with Rome was triggered by the Pope's refusal to
annul his marriage, and, in the centuries that followed, the English sought to
transfer jurisdiction of the civil consequences of marriages not to the Episcopal
Church, but to secular courts.
29. GROSSBERG, supra note 28, at 19; THE LAws AND LIBERTIES OF MASSA-
CHUSETTS, supra note 28, at 5.
30. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1890).
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the connection to sexual morality.3 ' In another of the nine-
teenth century cases dealing with polygamy, the Court held
out marriage as the "foundation of the family and of society,
without which there would be neither civilization nor pro-
gress."3 2 In 1967, without reference either to Christianity or
to direct support from constitutional text, the Supreme Court
found that marriage was one of the basic rights, "fundamen-
tal to our very existence and survival."33 Control of sexuality,
rather than the celebration of private contract, has long been
integral to the explanation of marriage's role in promoting
"civilization." The Supreme Court could, after all, deem mar-
riage fundamental to "our very existence" only with insis-
tence on marriage as a precondition to reproduction. Gross-
berg writes, in tracing the nineteenth century regulation of
marriage, that "[i]rregular or clandestine marriages faced an
uncertain reception because, as American legal authority
David Hoffman suggested in 1836, the end of marriage could
not be achieved 'unless promiscuous intercourse be re-
strained.' ,,34 Connecticut judges, as recently as 1964, had no
hesitancy in declaring that "the standards of society are such
that sexual relations or lascivious actions by persons who do
not have the benefit of marriage to one another are regarded
as obscene, unchaste and immoral."3 5 At least part of the his-
torical emphasis on marriage has stemmed from the desire to
provide a clear line of demarcation between licit and illicit
31. Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the Supreme Court in Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987), recently reaffirmed the role of marriage as "an
exercise of religious faith as well as an expression of personal dedication."
Nonetheless, as early as 1816, Connecticut judge Tapping Reeve set out to se-
cure the civil nature of marriage in order to wrest it from exclusively religious
governance, explaining that:
There is nothing in the nature of a marriage contract that is more sa-
cred than that of other contracts, that requires the interposition of a
person in holy orders, or that it should be solemnized in a church.
Every idea of this kind, entertained by any person, has arisen solely
from the usurpation of the Church of Rome on the rights of the civilian.
TAPPING REEVE, LAW OF BARON AND FEMME 307 (1816).
32. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).
33. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
34. GROSSBERG, supra note 28, at 64 (citing DAVID HOFFMAN, LEGAL OUT-
LINES 147 (1836)).
35. State v. Jones, 205 A.2d 507, 509 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1964).
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sexual relations; in short, to reinforce and police conventional
morality.36
Nonetheless, an economic justification has long coex-
isted, implicitly or explicitly, with the moral one. The second
half of the Loving reference, which goes beyond mere procrea-
tion to describe marriage as fundamental to our very exist-
ence "and survival," illustrates the point. This reference to
survival suggests that, in addition to the link to reproduction,
marriage contributes to the prospects for children's well-be-
ing and perhaps beyond that to the orderly organization of
society. The statement is undoubtedly true; indeed, it is al-
most axiomatic. It is also open to the charge of being end-
lessly circular. So long as society privileged marital unions
and punished and stigmatized "illegitimate" offspring, so long
as full market access was limited to those in a breadwinning
role and caregiving outside of marriage was unstable or ex-
pensive, and so long as family ties were central to the trans-
mission of wealth in society, marriage was the most promis-
ing route for securing the well-being of children. Society,
starting with an image of the family as a given, has con-
structed institutions premised on its stability. This analysis,
however, begs the question of whether marriage should be
the primary vehicle for accomplishing these ends. In an era
in which the family, and the relationship between the family
and the market, are undergoing transformation, the question
becomes more than an academic one.
The fact that the role of marriage has been assumed
rather than legislated, and that the importance of marriage
has rested on deeply held, but diverse and essentially private
beliefs, complicates the effort to consider what role marriage
should continue to play. Only the polar ends of the modern
debate are clear because only at polar ends of the debate is
there agreement on the relationship between private moral-
ity and state policy. The Christian Coalition and secular
groups that would champion traditional family values believe
that the state should play a major role in reinforcing the type
of sexual mores that have historically defined marriage as the
36. GROSSBERG, supra note 28, at 68. Grossberg, in considering the divi-
sions between public and private in the nineteenth century, emphasizes the in-
creasing importance of private choice in the selection of spouses and in the
choice of forums in which to express commitment while nonetheless affirming
state power to validate and regulate sexual unions. Id.
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only appropriate form of sexual expression.37 These groups
tend to support continued restrictions on fornication, sodomy
and abortion, a role for considerations of fault in the divorce
process, and state efforts to deter divorce and nonmarital
births. They would justify a state policy of insistence on the
importance of marriage either directly on religious principles
or on broadly based philosophical grounds.38
The other pole of the debate is represented by those who
would disestablish marriage as a societal institution. They
would treat the decision to marry or not marry, to engage or
not engage in sexual relationships, to bear children within a
relationship with a parental partner, without a partner, or
not at all, as matters of private choice in which the state
should not intrude s.3  These groups would characterize state
insistence on marriage as the only sanctioned locus for chil-
drearing, and any policy that would directly restrict the
availability of divorce or the ability of single parents to raise
their children, as unwarranted and oppressive.
This pole of the debate further divides into two philo-
sophically opposed camps based on their attitudes toward the
state's economic role. The first is the libertarian wing that
casts such issues in terms of the right to be free from govern-
ment dictation of private morality. Libertarians would insist
on the right to choose or not choose marriage, and assign the
state no responsibility for the consequences of their decisions
or the well-being of the resulting children.4 °
The other wing embraces a feminist critique of tradi-
tional marriage as an instrument of patriarchy that perpetu-
ates a gendered division of labor and locks the partners into
inherently unequal roles. The feminist left would eschew the
37. See FuCHS, supra note 6.
38. Immanuel Kant, for example, justifies marriage in terms of notions of
reciprocity he finds fundamental to respect for persons. JEREMY WALDRON,
When Justice Replaces Affection: The Need for Rights, in LIBERAL RIGHTS: COL-
LECTED PAPERS 1981-1991, 370, 370-73 (1993).
39. For a discussion of the liberal position see JEREMY WALDRON, John
Rauls and the Social Minimum, in LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-
1991, 250, 268-69 (1993); see also FINEMAN, supra note 2, at 180-93.
40. See generally JEREMY WALDRON, Welfare and the Images of Charity, in
LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991, 225, 226-30, 296-97, 457
(1993). The new right argues, as they have in the debate on welfare reform,
that the existence of a safety net, including one that provides for children, en-
courages parents to make riskier decisions than they would otherwise, and thus
worsens conditions in the long run. Id. at 296-97.
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rights language of libertarians and charge the government di-
rectly with responsibility for remedying the gendered nature
of wage labor that limits parental ability to participate in the
labor market, and for insuring the well-being of children irre-
spective of their parents' relationship. 4 '
In between the two poles are those who would rely on a
utilitarian cost-benefit analysis, concluding that (1) the well-
being of children concerns society as a whole; (2) given the
current constitution of society, children are better off in two-
parent families; and (3) the state should therefore do what it
can to reinforce marriage, and deter divorce and nonmarital
births. This analysis differs from that of the family values
coalition in that it leaves the judgment as to the morality of
the underlying conduct to the private sphere. It differs from
the libertarian and feminist critiques in that it does not re-
gard the failure to pass judgment in the public sphere as a
barrier to state action. Nonetheless, the premises of the utili-
tarian calculus are offset by concern that the benefits from
any action the government could take to encourage family
stability would be more than offset by the difficulties of en-
forcement, and the potential for injustice. Galston justifies
the Clinton administration's initial welfare reform proposals
in these terms, emphasizing the importance of encouraging
two-parent families and the symbolic role of welfare reform
as one of the few instruments of government policy that
might be used to serve such ends.
Divisions along these lines are hardly new. Nineteenth
century discussions of the family included many of the same
disagreements and challenges to the use of state power to re-
inforce conventional morality, but there are at least two
changes that significantly reshape the debate. First, the
overwhelming consensus that equated nonmarital sexual ac-
tivity with license rather than with liberty has dissolved into
deep-seated disagreement.42 Second, the empirical question
of the causal link between children's well-being and the sta-
41. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 2, at 226-36.
42. See, e.g., STEPHANIE CoONZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN
FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP 201 (1992) (noting that in 1984, 60% of peo-
ple aged 23-38 approved of casual sex, compared to only 28% of those older than
age 38). Coontz also reports that an anthropological study concerning sexual
behavior in over 250 societies found that only three shared a "generalized sex
taboo" on sexual behavior of any type outside of marriage. Id. at 184.
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bility of marriage is being debated rather than assumed.43
The result of these changes is to call into question not only
the wisdom, but the authority, and ultimately the practical-
ity, of a policy that relies exclusively on marriage for the well-
being of families.
The third question concerns the viability of a family pol-
icy that depends exclusively, or even primarily, on marriage
to provide for children's well-being. If the issue were simply a
matter of predicting the response to a public opinion poll that
asked: "Are children generally better off raised by two biolog-
ical parents, and should individuals have an obligation to do
what they can to insure such a result?" the question might
have a simple answer. Instead, the answer overwhelmingly
focuses on what role the state should play when a majority of
parents bring children into the world under circumstances in
which they are unlikely to remain with both biological par-
ents through their minority. The answer to this question,
like the other answers, lies in the divide between public and
private as it depends largely on whether any public response
can compensate for the atrophy of private mechanisms of
control.
To the extent that, in earlier eras, children were more
likely to be raised in two-parent households, private coercion
was a major factor. Control of sexuality has almost always
been a matter of concern for human society and, in practice,
much of the concern has focused on the supervision of young
women. The ideal in many societies has been for girls to
move from their father's house to their husband's at an age
sufficiently close to the onset of sexual maturity to remove
much of the temptation for sexual experimentation. Once
safely married, the couple's relationship might change over
time, but the marriage was forever, and the couple's re-
sources tied to the product of their union.44
43. See, e.g., Paul R. Amato, Life-Span Adjustment of Children to Their Par-
ent's Divorce, 4 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 142-64 (1994); Sara McLanahan, In-
tergenerational Consequences of Divorce: The United States Perspective, in Eco-
NOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE: THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 285
(Lenore J. Weitzman & Mavic Maclean eds., 1992).
44. For discussions of the family and changes over time, see generally ED-
WARD SHORTER, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN FAMILY (1975); EDWARD SHORTER,
THE FAMILY IN HISTORY (Charles E. Rosenberg ed., 1975).
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While many societies overtly attempt to enforce chastity
(public whippings, the scarlet letter), the more common
mechanisms are a combination of adoption, abortion, shotgun
marriages and the stigmatization of illegitimacy that effec-
tively prevent single mothers from raising children on their
own. In the late eighteenth century, one third of all New
England brides were pregnant at the time of marriage.4"
During the fifties, the rate of teenage childbearing soared,
reaching highs not equaled since, but only fifteen percent of
the births were to unmarried mothers. Rather, adoptions in-
creased by eighty percent between 1944 and 1955, while the
average age of marriage dropped, and the percentage of preg-
nant brides doubled.46
Marriage, however, insures two-parent households only
so long as the parents remain married, and shotgun mar-
riages work as instruments of social control only in societies
in which divorce is difficult. Earlier eras stigmatized divorce
even in circumstances in which it was legally available, and
women's economic dependence made divorce impractical, if
not impossible. As a result, divorce tended to serve as a solu-
tion of last resort, and a much higher percentage of couples
remained married even if they effectively lived separate
lives.47
All of these instruments of social control have atrophied,
many as part of long term changes in the organization of fam-
ily life. First, despite our tendency to think of recent changes
as a sexual revolution, Victorian sexual rectitude, if it ever
fully existed, ended with the Victorian age, not the sixties. At
the turn of the century, New York City reported a fifty per-
cent decline in prostitution, reportedly in response to the
greater availability of other women. The fifties, not the eight-
ies, witnessed the greatest recent increase in teenage births.
The decades since the advent of the pill have been character-
ized more by deferred childbearing, attenuation of the double
standard, and greater openness toward, and acceptance of
45. Sylvia A. Law, Abortion in America: A Tangled History, Opponents'
Emphasis on Protecting Fetus Obscures Earlier Goals, ATLANTA CONST., May 7,
1989, at D1.
46. CooN z, supra note 42, at 3, 39.
47. For accounts of the history of divorce in the United States, see generally
MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE AND THE LAw (1972); NELSON
M. BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES
(1962); MARY A. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAw (1987).
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nonmarital sexuality than by increases in fertility. 48 None-
theless, the increased independence of women, and the im-
portance of deferred childbearing to the acquisition of human
capital for both men and women, make it likely that the
changes in attitudes toward sexuality, particularly those that
stem from the separation of sexuality and fertility, are long-
term ones.
Second is the increase in divorce rates. Although mar-
riages may not on average have lasted much longer in earlier
eras, the major cause of termination was death, not divorce.
Between 1960 and 1982, the divorce rate tripled, leveling off
at a rate in which one of every two first marriages, and sixty
percent of second marriages end in divorce.49
Third, the response to unplanned pregnancies is continu-
ing to change. In the fifties, pregnant teenagers, in the face
of parental insistence and societal stigma, overwhelmingly
elected marriage or adoption. With the greater accessibility
of abortion following Roe v. Wade, white women increasingly
chose abortion over marriage, and fertility decreased across
the board.50 In the last five years, younger women, particu-
larly whites, have become more likely to choose single
parenthood over adoption, abortion or a potentially shaky
marriage. The result is that nonmarital births now account
for thirty percent of the total, with higher percentages farther
down the socio-economic ladder. In the African-American
community, marriage has never been as promising as in the
white community, and the resistance to abortion has been
greater. As a result, while overall fertility rates have de-
clined, particularly for married women, the proportion of
nonmarital births has increased to over sixty percent of the
total.5 1
48. Law, supra note 45, at D8 (noting that in 1787, the average white Amer-
ican woman bore seven children; by the late 1870's, the average was fewer than
five; by 1900, it was 3.56). American fertility rates reached a record low of ap-
proximately two children per family in 1976, and were below the replacement
rate for white middle class women. Phillip Longman, Justice Between Genera-
tions, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1985, at 73, 79.
For a review of more recent changes, see COONTZ, supra note 42.
49. COONTZ, supra note 42, at 3.
50. The figures for African-Americans show a continuation, rather than an
acceleration, of previous trends. See generally CooNTr, supra note 42, at 232-
54.
51. See Furstenberg, supra note 9, at 29-43.
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This combination of factors effectively means that the
private controls that insured birth within marriage are no
longer so effective. The older pattern of young women who
moved from their father's to their husband's supervision is
52gone. The stigma that once attended nonmarital sexuality
and childbearing is no longer as strong, and in some commu-
nities it is largely nonexistent. Women's greater economic in-
dependence, along with general economic uncertainty and
hardship, increase rates of divorce and make young relation-
ships less stable. While the mix of abortion, adoption, mar-
riage, and single-parent births is likely to change over time,
class and race, the forces that once made marriage the uni-
versal locus of childrearing are no longer so reliable.
In the face of such changes in the private realm, the ear-
lier mechanisms of state policy, and most of the proposed re-
forms, appear ineffective or irrelevant. There seems to be lit-
tle sentiment for a return to fault-based divorce or
stigmatizing illegitimacy, much less for the pillory or the
scarlet letter. Public reaffirmation of the importance of mar-
riage is unlikely to affect those for whom marriage is not an
attractive or realistic option.53 Such efforts will succeed only
to the extent they make single parenthood impossible. The
effectiveness of welfare reform, whether of the Clinton or the
Gingrich persuasions, is premised on creating the specter of
parents giving up children they are unable to feed. Even
then it is unclear how much impact such policies will have
without greater support for abortion or marriage.
The fourth question is, What are the alternatives? If
state policy depends on consensus in the private realm, what
avenues are open in an era of disagreement? To the extent
that there is a remaining consensus about family matters, it
is likely to be an insistence on the importance of, and obliga-
tion to children. Amidst disagreement about almost every-
thing else, the overwhelming majority of Americans would
agree that children matter, and that private notions of re-
sponsibility include an obligation to provide for the well-being
52. Id. at 31. Women's average age of marriage increased from 20 in the
mid-fifties to 24.4 in 1992.
53. Fifty-five percent of a survey of 16-year-old girls indicated that they
would consider becoming single parents if they did not marry. FINEMAN, supra
note 2, at 150.
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of our children. The law reviews, the courts, and the halls of
Congress ring with calls to put children first, to make chil-
dren's concerns more visible, and to have parents act more
responsibly.54 The disagreements concern the definitions of
children's interests, and the articulation of the corresponding
rights and responsibilities that attend such relationships.
In bringing this conference together, much of the effort to
consider different images of the family involves an effort to
reexamine our relationships with children - both private
and public, individual and institutional. We have different
perspectives on how these relationships are formed, main-
tained, and governed. The experiences of those outside the
mainstream of American society, and, indeed, outside of
American society altogether, provide different lenses that fa-
cilitate our examination of the family. In considering the ob-
ligations and opportunities for public policy toward the fam-
ily, we need to start by examining the private mores that
emerge from different communities and ask, in a fundamen-
tal way, whether there is remaining common ground. I be-
lieve that the most fruitful area for potential agreement is
likely to be premised on the importance of children.
Within the legal world, this process is well under way.
Marriage, as a lifelong commitment with corresponding legal
obligations between husband and wife, may be dead, but it
has been replaced by a renewed insistence on permanent ties
between parent and child. 55 Marriage may no longer be a de-
fining element in recognition of fathers' relationships with
their children, but it has been supplanted by recognition of a
biological tie that can only be intentionally severed.56 The
parents' relationship to each other, once governed exclusively
by marriage, is now being redefined by joint custody, support
orders, visitation agreements, temporary restraining orders
and adoption'rights. In other countries, it has been divorce
rather than nonmarital births that has forced reconsideration
of the relationship between the state and the family.57 In the
54. See, e.g., FUCHS, supra note 6; SyLviA A. HEWLETT, WHEN THE BOUGH
BREAKS: THE COST OF NEGLECTING OUR CHILDREN (1991); Richard T. Gill, For
the Sake of the Children, 108 PUB. INTEREST 81 (1992); Mary A. Glendon, Fam-
ily Law Reform in the 1980's, 44 LA. L. REV. 1553, 1557-65 (1984).
55. See FINEMAN, supra note 2, at 228-36.
56. See id. at 81-87.
57. See, e.g., JOHN EEKELAAR, REGULATING DIVORCE (1991).
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United States, the relationship between private obligation
and state responsibility has yet to be redefined.
II. THE SYMPOSIUM
The papers in this symposium begin by examining the
premises from which societal provision for childrearing
should proceed. In The Nature of Dependencies and Welfare
"Reform," Martha Fineman links two observations that set
her conclusions apart from more conventional analyses of the
family. First, she explains that dependency - the depen-
dence of children, the elderly, and the infirm on caretakers,
and the corresponding dependence of caretakers on others for
their financial sufficiency - is an ordinary and inevitable
part of life. Second, Fineman argues that caretaking benefits
not only those for whom the care is provided, but society gen-
erally, and that caretakers should not be marginalized be-
cause of their efforts. Fineman concludes that the only way
to prevent such a result is for society to assume much greater
direct responsibility for caretaking.
In Public Morality and Public Policy: The Case of Chil-
dren and Family Policy, William Galston agrees that the con-
sequences of caretaking, of both its successes and failures,
are borne by society as a whole. He differs from Fineman in
his insistence that "the intact two-parent family is best
suited" to the task of childrearing, psychologically as well as
financially. Galston would therefore discharge government
responsibility for caretaking through job creation, tax policy,
health care and other benefits designed to promote the tradi-
tional family's economic stability, and through moral leader-
ship reinforcing biologically-based parental responsibility for
children.
The second set of papers examines family structure
within the context of African-American, lesbian, and interna-
tional communities that fail to conform to Galston's definition
of the ideal. Two themes unite these presentations. First, for
systemic societal reasons, many women do not enjoy the op-
tion of childrearing within a nuclear two-parent family; yet,
the efforts to promote more traditional "family values" dispro-
portionately penalize them. Second, the characterization of
the debate in terms of "two-parent" versus "one-parent" fami-
lies trivializes or ignores the contributions of other adults.
The heterosexual, middle-class, white, American discussion
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of divorce and nonmarital births cannot, therefore, fully cap-
ture the importance of these issues for other communities.
Jane Mauldon introduces these papers with a presenta-
tion of the demographic data underlying recent changes in
family composition. She documents the increase in
nonmarital births and men's "flight from the family" as a
smaller percentage of adult males live in families "of their
own." She links these changes to a general decline in mar-
riage rates for young adults, the lengthened period of
nonmarital sexual activity, poorer employment prospects for
young men, fewer shotgun marriages, and the lesser stigma
associated with nonmarital childrearing. Mauldon concludes
that given the large scale nature of these changes, and their
relationship to long-term cultural and economic forces, wel-
fare changes are unlikely to have much effect on the overall
picture.
Twila Perry, in Family Values, Race, Feminism and Pub-
lic Policy, discusses the role of race in family values rhetoric.
She observes that white society has historically undermined
black families, whether by refusing to grant legal status to
slave marriages or through modern practices that restrict the
employment prospects of black men. She concludes that ac-
ceptance of single motherhood, under circumstances in which
the larger community simultaneously stigmatizes it and pro-
motes it among African-Americans, is an example of the ways
in which black families and communities create independent
moral meaning.
Nancy Polikoff addresses The Deliberate Construction of
Families Without Fathers: Is It an Option for Lesbian and
Heterosexual Mothers? She argues that the law should re-
spect women's right to form families without fathers, and
that the construction of parenthood should not rest exclu-
sively on biology. Polikoff embraces private ordering as the
cornerstone of her approach, albeit with concern that the
overriding American emphasis on private support may leave
many women with few real choices.
Nicole Sault brings an anthropological perspective to the
construction of family in Many Mothers, Many Fathers: The
Meaning of Parenting Around the World. She observes that
the United States is unusual in its emphasis on the nuclear
family, and that other societies recognize a broader array of
family relationships. As a result, a larger community of
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adults participates in, and assumes responsibility for
childrearing.
In commenting on these papers, Michael Meyer, in Fam-
ily Virtues and the Common Good, discusses the role philo-
sophical concepts such as "virtue" and the "common good" can
play in the discussion of the family. Meyer argues that liber-
als make a mistake in conceding the concept of virtue to con-
servatives; that much of the discussion in the conference can
be recast in terms of the importance of the virtue of "nurtur-
ing," and the best ways to promote it. He similarly argues
that the American emphasis on individualism, and on the di-
visions between rich and poor, black and white, traditional
and nontraditional families often obscure society's collective
interest in family and children.
The final set of papers returns to the importance of fam-
ily structure to children's well-being. In The State of the
Family and the Family Policy Debate, David Blankenhorn ar-
gues that the evidence is overwhelming that children's well-
being is declining, and that the leading cause is. "family frag-
mentation, or the steady break-up of the mother-father chil-
draising unit." He insists that family break-up produces not
just the lower income experienced by single-parent families,
but that father absence contributes to a host of behavioral
problems from male violence to psychiatric illness to
problems in girls' sexual development. He advocates policies
that promote "the idea that unwed childbearing is wrong,
that our divorce rate is far too high, and that every child de-
serves a father."
Willemsen and Marcel, in Attachment 101 for Attorneys:
Implications for Infant Placement Decisions, examine the so-
cial science literature on attachment and conclude that em-
pirical evidence strongly supports the importance of con-
tinuity in children's relationships with their caretakers. The
data they develop suggests that we should re-examine the
growing legal emphasis on biology in custody decisions in
favor of greater attention to the child's existing attachments.
The symposium ends with Willemsen and Willemsen's
review essay, Martha Fineman's The Neutered Mother, the
Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies: She
Threw Out the Baby with the Old Feminism. The essay takes
issue with Fineman's call for a "winner take all" primary
caretaker custody standard, and advocates a "best interests"
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standard that would make "parental rights subordinate to
the child's right to be nurtured and to continue nurturing
relationships."
